

Memo from

To:

JOSHUA LEDERBERG

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Father Decker


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BW

The US has strongly supported this proposal. The USSR has refused, demanding instead a vague, and uninspected, unenforceable prohibition against ~~xxxxxxxxxxx~~ the production and stockpiling of all biological and chemical weapons. Is a tank car of chlorine gas, for industrial use, a 'weapon'? It is quite clear this is just a stalling tactic. Meanwhile, they have made no commitments whatever (beyond the no FIRST use implied by the Geneva protocol) in response to Pres. Nixon's policy statement on BW. Since the Geneva protocol has had explicit reservations universally attached that limit it to FIRST use, i.e., that would legitimize C or BW in retaliation, it is no inhibition whatever against stockpiling C or BW munitions. Knowing that they indeed have such stockpiles, what weight should you give to their mere pledge that they do not intend to use such weapons? I fear that any arrangements that give them a further advantage to the pursuit of clandestine work will also give further leverage to the already powerful totalitarian element of what is now the penultimate of a police state.

Needless to say, the historic (<1970) position of the US on the Geneva protocol, was an insufferable blot.




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